This conventional wisdom was articulated forcefully by Richard B. This introductory essay utilizes this recent historical material to further revisit and clarify the significance of Dimona and provide greater context to the crisis and war of 1967. Series Title: Responsibility: Ami Gluska. Yet all these narratives share the fundamental idea that the crisis sprung from a series of miscalculations that ultimately led to the failure of conventional deterrence. The euphoria and complacency were the main causes for missing opportunities to move towards peace. The revision of Intelligence evaluations and the shift to offensive planning -- 15. Israelis and world Jewry sensed euphoria from the victory.
Shlaim, Avi, and William Roger Louis. Quandt, Peace Process Washington, D. This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general. Two political streams in Israel slowly emerged—one that wanted to settle in the newly acquired territories, and a second that sought to relinquish them for treaties with Arab states. Gluska: To answer this question one would need a lot more space than this framework offers. William Zartman The Israeli Response: Bernard Reich The Other Arab Responses: E.
The start of the crisis -- 13. In tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue, the Center informs actionable ideas for Congress, the administration, and the broader policy community. The next quote, of course, comes from President Lyndon Johnson. But one obvious explanation is that as the likelihood of war intensified, Israel did something it never had done previously: its scientists assembled all the components, including the handful of nuclear cores it had, into improvised but operational explosive devices. Second, and more significantly, those testimonies reveal now that Israel, during the May—June 1967 crisis, first assembled its first rudimentary nuclear devices.
S entanglement in the Iraqi mud weakens its position. Their conclusions make for sober reading. Middle East historian Douglas Little touches briefly on the role Dimona played in encouraging more belligerent Arab attitudes from 1966 onwards in his influential book, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina press, 1992 , but he stops short of delving deeper into the nuclear question. It probably will not be possible again to assemble this many individuals who were in policy-making positions during the 1967 war. Escalation -- stage 1 : from skirmishes in the demilitarized zones to aerial sorties -- 4. At the heart of the story was the incompetence of the Egyptian leadership and the rivalry between various Arab players who were deeply suspicious of each other's motives. This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.
In May 2017, I had a phone conversation with one of the Israeli pilots, Colonel Giora Even Espstein , who participated in that aerial encounter. Gluska: The whole strategic panorama has changed dramatically over the years, and there's not enough space here to describe the results of the 1967 war and the wars that followed. Ernest Dawn The View from Washington: Donald C. When the nuclear issue is mentioned, it is in passing and treated as anecdotal rather than essential. The outcome is a testimony that sounds at times unclear, confusing, even self-contradictory.
Israeli jets launched to intercept the invading MiGs, but due to short warning and high altitude they were unable to engage. In retrospect, how significant were these events? The clash with Syria approaches -- 10. Israel chose to defend itself proactively because it knew, as the United States only found out later, that Egypt had planned to attack it. The Arab armies have been routed, ground divisions wiped out, air forces totally destroyed. What Maté leaves out is why they were provoked. The other threats are of course radical Islamic terrorism regional and international and the unsolved conflicts with Syria and the Palestinians.
But, fearing the fallout of attacking a Soviet-backed Syria, the leadership decided to strike a Fatah stronghold in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. Establishment of a national unity government : the military aspect -- 21. In fact an order to carry out that operation had been issued then retracted according to different Egyptian accounts e. Only a book of this kind. In the ultimate irony, Maté decided to revise history significantly to make this claim. Both Rabin and Yariv subsequently distanced themselves from that alarm.
Developed from a State Department conference marking the 25th anniversary of the war, this analysis and discussion provide the most authoritative account we have of the genesis of the Arab-Israeli war. Escalation -- stage 3 : 'harassment' -- 7. The land under Israeli control has tripled. This omission is likely a manifestation of the deep-seated taboo on the topic of Dimona. This is not surprising given a tendency on both sides to look the other way on the relevance of nuclear weapons to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Decisive Meeting in the Pit: The Ministerial Committee versus the General Staff 23.